What’s left? Land expropriation, socialist “modernizers”, and peasant resistance in Asia by Steur, Luisa Johanna
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
What’s left?  Land expropriation, socialist “modernizers”, and peasant resistance in
Asia
Steur, Luisa Johanna
Published in:
Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology
DOI:
do i:10.3167/fcl.2009.540105
10.3167/fcl.2009.540105
Publication date:
2009
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Steur, L. J. (2009). What’s left? Land expropriation, socialist “modernizers”, and peasant resistance in Asia.
Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 54, 67. https://doi.org/do i:10.3167/fcl.2009.540105,
https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2009.540105
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
What’s left? Land expropriation, socialist “modernizers,”
and peasant resistance in Asia
Luisa Steur and Ritanjan Das
With the victory of capitalism and the end of
the Cold War, almost all countries in the global
south, including those still calling themselves
“communist,” have become “transition” coun-
tries, competing to attract foreign direct invest-
ment and reform according to the strictures of
global capitalism. Particularly interesting cases
of “transition” are those states that explicitly le-
gitimize their rule in terms of communist ideals,
the general alliance of peasants and workers 
toward an egalitarian society, and whose ideo-
logical pillars historically include a pro-poor re-
distributive land reform. This forum debate
focuses on three such states in Asia: the world’s
longest-running democratically elected com-
munist state of West Bengal (part of the Indian
federation), the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
and the People’s Republic of China. It focuses,
more precisely, on the land struggles taking place
in these states that have not embraced neo-lib-
eralism ideologically but all see rural unrest in-
creasing as peasant land is cleared for Special
Economic Zones and other capitalist invest-
ment—usually purportedly aimed at “industri-
alization” and consequent employment creation
but often driven by real estate speculation and
elite consumption, accompanied by the creation
of a huge reserve army of labor (Banerjee-Guha
2008). Even modernizing “communist” coun-
tries, where land expropriation is the order of
the day, thus seem to be following the trend 
in contemporary capitalism that David Harvey
(2005) conceptualizes as the shift in emphasis
from expanded reproduction to accumulation
by dispossession.
A comparative perspective on these cases
raises several questions. To begin with, is commu-
nism in these states simply the window-dressing
of a capitalist accumulation drive? On the one
hand, there are strong indications to answering
this question in the affirmative. Projit Mukharji
shows how in subtle ways the Communist Party
rhetoric that used to incite class struggle in West
Bengal has transformed into a discourse legit-
imizing ruthless capitalist expansion. He also ar-
gues that communist ideology and politics do
not play a part in the day-to-day operations of
the party any longer. Tanika Sarkar and Sumit
Chowdhury state that the international Left need
not look at the Communist Party of West Ben-
gal for inspiration as it has totally deviated from
socialism—it is instead the peasant and people’s
movements that the party violently suppresses
that embody the true legacy of the Left. More-
over, we know from Naomi Klein (2007) and can
see in Bo Zhao’s contribution to this forum, that
communism in China nowadays serves prima-
rily as the mechanism through which political
dissent against a dramatic shift toward free mar-
ket policies is being suppressed. What is usually
interpreted in the West—and is represented to
it as such by many Chinese dissidents—as re-
sistance against communism, may more likely
be seen as resistance against neo-liberalism cyn-
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ically dressed up as communism. Zhao does not
go so far as to claim this but does argue that since
“the terminal crisis of international communism
in late 1980s, what glues party members together
is no longer so much communist ideology as
mere pursuit of individual interest.” What we
see from Vietnam, meanwhile, is that though
the official figures of land expropriated for spe-
cial economic zones—and golf courses!—are tre-
mendous, the communist state discourse that
labels such processes the “transfer of land use
rights” functions mainly to euphemize a process
that the opposition in liberal-capitalist property
regimes would simply have called dispossession.
Still, there seem to be certain distinctions be-
tween land expropriation struggles in commu-
nist China, Vietnam, and West Bengal and the
larger phenomenon of economic adjustment
across the developing world. The stories told here
would find parallels in the tenacious struggles
raging both inside governments and between
governments and various interest groups in
“transition” countries over issues such as “trade
liberalization, reallocation of government ex-
penditures, reduction in government regulation
and subsidization of private economy” (Nelson
1989: xi). But there also seems to be a difference
in that more so than in states committed to a
purely free market ideal, there is a recognition
of the developmental role of the state in assum-
ing the responsibility to “discriminate between
progressive and regressive aspects of capital ac-
cumulation … and … guide the former towards
a more generalized political goal that has more
universal valency” (Harvey 2005: 179). Reject-
ing any such efforts as simply capitalist, without
paying attention to details on the ground, or a
priori dismissing the institutional legitimacy of
such efforts holds the danger of degenerating
into an anti-development “politics of nostalgia
for that which has been lost,” superseding the
search for better ways to meet the material needs
of the population (ibid.: 177). All three coun-
tries discussed in this forum pay a lot of lip-
service to this search, not only because of the
unrest that reform provokes but also because the
legitimacy of the state is so closely connected to
its success in promoting general welfare rather
than, in the case of for example the United States,
primarily serving to promote “freedom and de-
mocracy.” The official communist rhetoric em-
ployed in these three states allows citizens to
stake their claims to economic rights, and par-
ticularly land, in accordance with the dominant
discourse, potentially increasing the legitimacy
and power of such claims. But the opposite is also
imaginable. Though Sarkar and Chowdhury as
well as Mukherji criticize the communist “class”
discourse of the government of West Bengal for
not being genuinely communist, a different re-
action—seen more in Zhao’s article—is to in-
stead find inspiration in the dominant ideals of
global civil society and criticize government
policy in a totally different register—that of
liberal democracy. An important question this
forum raises—though does not conclusively an-
swer—is to what extent a fundamental under-
standing and critique of capitalist accumulation
processes is either helped or hindered by the
historical presence of a strong local Marxist tra-
dition, now appropriated by the ruling class.
In addition to the question of whether or not
there are significant differences that make the
(so-called?) communist countries of Asia stand
out in practice from countries that have em-
braced neo-liberal capitalism more wholeheart-
edly, another important question arises—that
of the substantial differences among these three
states. The most obvious source of divergence,
besides size and geo-political position, is the
fact that Vietnam and China are one-party au-
thoritarian states whereas West Bengal is a dem-
ocratic state, whose commitment to democracy
is backed-up by a formally democratic Indian
union government. It seems that one consequent
difference is that in China and Vietnam, more
so than in West Bengal, the state can often get
away with a high-handed solution to what is re-
ferred to as the “distributive conflict problem”—
the problem that the costs of efforts to increase
the aggregate social wealth in a society for the
general benefit of all have to be shouldered quite
concretely by certain opposing groups. This dif-
ference is reflected in an overall slower pace of
industrialization in India and a greater “check”
on governments’ actions, prohibiting it in prin-
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ciple from taking any drastic steps, such as force-
ful acquisition of land, and allowing owners
(though not necessarily all inhabitants or work-
ers) of land targeted for industrial development
more means of resisting expropriation or pres-
surizing the government to ensure proper reha-
bilitation for them. In this forum we do not
hear of Chinese or Vietnamese cases where the
drive toward land expropriation has actually
been halted as it was in Nandigram. In a demo-
cratic set-up, it seems, ruling parties need to
take more heed of the principle formulated by
Haggard and Kauffman, that “a reform that gen-
erates a net social gain should be politically vi-
able [only] if a portion of the gains are used to
compensate the groups experiencing losses”
(1995: 157). For West Bengal’s ruling party,
there is a more acutely politically consequential
“policy-change dilemma” of “how to modify the
core commitment of its partisan and ideological
agenda toward public sector-led industrializa-
tion and redistributive economic policy strate-
gies without losing its core support base—the
public sector workers and agrarian peasants”
(Sinha Forthcoming: 18). A related crucial dis-
tinction in Indian versus Chinese and Vietnam-
ese cases is that while Sarkar and Chowdhury
and Mukherji question the moral authority of
West Bengal’s communist government to dispose
farmers of their land/traditional livelihood, this
ideological dilemma is less pronounced in China
and Vietnam, where private ownership of land
is prohibited. As discussed by Suu and Zhao,
land is largely state or collectively owned both
in Vietnam and China, allowing the state to 
allocate or withdraw land use rights to/from 
individuals in the name of public interest. The
debate in Vietnam and China therefore seems
to revolve primarily around policy formulation
(land pricing, compensation) and implementa-
tion (through adequate institutions). Though
such questions are equally important for eco-
nomic development of West Bengal, moral/ide-
ological debates usually dominate there.
The determined resistance of the peasants of
Nandigram, as narrated by Sarkar and Chowd-
hury, may also, however, point to some of the
weaknesses of West-Bengal’s democracy. De-
spite—or perhaps due to—being more author-
itarian, the state in Vietnam and in China seems
in some aspects more in control of the “distrib-
utive conflict problem.” One of the blunders of
the West Bengal Left Front government in its
dealings with the Salim corporation was for in-
stance to offer the extremely fertile land in Nan-
digram rather than less productive “wasteland,”
which it did primarily to be able to use the ex-
isting infrastructure in the area rather than de-
velop a new one. Special Economic Zones seem
more strategically located in China than in India,
where such planning is influenced by a myriad of
interest groups. The democratic process in India
makes policy-making proceed at a slower pace,
not just in terms of dispossession but also in
terms of proper rehabilitation legislation. The
forum articles focusing on Vietnam and China,
though paying less attention to the question of
the legitimacy of capitalist land transfers, do pay
considerable attention to three main problems
that inevitably arise during land transfers: the
correct pricing of land, adequate and encompass-
ing compensation schemes, and an effective re-
settlement and rehabilitation policy. Zhao shows
that there are detailed legal mechanisms in place
in China to deal with all three issues (though he
criticizes the faulty implementation of these
laws and in particular the impunity with which
laws are broken). Because the Communist Party
is directly identified with the state in China and
Vietnam and because the one-party set-up dis-
courages fundamental political turmoil (unlike in
India, where some political parties in fact thrive
on such), it is perhaps all the more fundamen-
tal for the party not to allow dispossession to go
too far. Note Giovanni Arrighi’s (2007) convic-
tion that the Chinese state is well aware of the
instability that radical expropriation of peasant
land and total proletarianization of workers
would cause and therefore will not easily be seen
privatizing land and taking it away from peas-
ants beyond a certain point. Whether this de-
gree of “self-restraint” by the Chinese state is a
legacy of its socialist history or of a longer Con-
fucian imperial strategy of benevolent paternal-
ism is an open question; it would be interesting
to see to what extent this self-restraint will last.
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Another point on which to compare the three
cases in this forum is their institutional set-up.
A lack of effective institutions at the local level
to manage the issue of land transfer is empha-
sized mostly in the article on China—including
a critique of the corrupt and inefficient bureau-
cratic channels, the poor law enforcement, and
the party-controlled judicial systems. Lest we
focus too much on the idea of local institutional
inadequacy, it must be noted that in China, the
imperial tradition of peasants petitioning the
emperor, or later the Communist Party leader-
ship, to find redress for abuses by local authori-
ties (both systematically encouraged toward such
abuses but also publicly condemned for them
by the center) seems alive as ever in the “right-
ful resistance” taking place in the countryside
(see O’Brien and Li 2006), but with a growing
number of these petitioners finding themselves
persecuted by the state. What looks like local in-
stitutional failure thereby might well be a sys-
tematic way by which the Chinese central state
tries to deal politically with the contradictions
of the path of capitalist development it has em-
barked on. Institutional inadequacy is probably
as acute in West Bengal. One example is Singhur,
where after expropriating land from peasants,
building a half-baked car production plant, and
receiving huge subsidies from the West Bengal
state, the Tata company decided at the last mo-
ment to give in to peasant protest and move in-
stead to notoriously neo-liberal Gujarat. What
made the mediocre policies of land expropria-
tion in West-Bengal eventually lead to outcomes
that were disadvantageous to all local players
involved is perhaps the fact that the state had
little control over the various institutions needed
to implement its policy precisely because in a
democracy, adequate institutional functioning
entails “an independent regulatory commission
with judicial powers to oversee the whole proc-
ess … operat[ing] at arm’s-length from the gov-
ernment, with independently appointed officials
… and with the judicial authority to request in-
formation from the government … with the me-
dia acting as a watchdog” (Banerjee et al. 2007:
1489). This democratic institutional commitment
in West Bengal combines with an intensely com-
petitive environment confronting all state gov-
ernment in India to attract private investments
since in 1991 the federal Congress government
embraced an era of concerted economic reforms
(Jenkins, 1999; Sáez, 2002). Unlike in China, the
central government in India to some extent ac-
tively promotes the drive for greater financial
regional independence in the transition from a
dirigiste mode of planning to a liberalized eco-
nomic environment. The compulsions this has
placed on the Left Front government in West
Bengal is reflected in Chief Minister Buddhadeb
Bhattacharya’s perhaps genuine words: “I can-
not build socialism in this part of the country
… What we are looking at is the Left alternative
and the compulsions of the objective situation”
(The Hindu, 27 February 2007).
Despite these “compulsions of the objective
situation,” some (Sarkar and Chowdhury) would
argue the cases discussed in this forum are not
so much examples of land expropriation under
Asia’s modernizing Left but under Stalinist ver-
sions of Asian capitalism. The three cases con-
sidered in this forum do not, however, exhaust
the possible alternatives to neo-liberalism in Asia
or elsewhere. For many (e.g., Sandbrook et al.
2007), Kerala would be a more logical place in
Asia to look for inspiration for a leftist alterna-
tive to neo-liberalism, even though—or probably
precisely because—it is a state where commu-
nists manage to stay in power only for one elec-
tion term at a time. But critical Kerala scholars
will also point out that Kerala’s communist party
has not only recently become heavily implicated
in corporate corruption scandals but has also,
despite rhetoric to the contrary, started to imple-
ment economic policies that embrace neo-lib-
eralism (see, e.g., Devika 2007). Also in Kerala,
the Communist Party’s Marxist discourse is be-
ing experienced as a mechanism to silence or
co-opt, rather than empower, the political aspi-
rations of subaltern groups (e.g., Steur 2009).
At Chengara, in Kerala, thousands of dalit, adi-
vasi, and other landless people who revived the
specter of pro-poor land reform by occupying
land on a formerly corporately owned planta-
tion, have found themselves pitted against the
present communist-led government trying to
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undermine their movement. Tension at Chen-
gara between land reform activists and commu-
nist cadres has frequently become so intense
that fears of another “Nandigram” have arisen
(see Rammohan 2008).
Kerala’s example, therefore, does not allow us
to think that there are regions where the estab-
lished Left has not been implicated in the proc-
esses of accumulation by dispossession that have
been intensifying since the global advent of neo-
liberalism. But it does confirm that local socialist
histories can still contribute to the present-day
political struggles for a more just redistribution
of wealth. In West Bengal the socialist legacy of
peasants organizing for their right to land against
capitalist predators is invoked against the ruling
Left Front government’s turn toward neo-liber-
alism. In Kerala, still more democratic than West
Bengal in that no single party has a de facto mo-
nopoly on political power, an increasing num-
ber of people that have been dispossessed of
their land because of economic liberalization
(Banarjee-Guha 2008: 57) are now pro-actively
claiming land as a people’s right and a historical
promise of Keralese democratic socialism, be-
trayed by politicians hypocritically posing as
communists. Whereas in Vietnam and China,
oppositional movements seem to find little gen-
uine inspiration in socialist legacies and instead
frame their dissent against authoritarian social-
ist predators in terms of claims to property, civil
society, and democracy, resistance against more
democratic socialist predators in West Bengal
and Kerala is often articulated in a more social-
ist register, with reference to alter-globalist, anti-
capitalist ideals and redistributive claims to land
(see Omvedt 1993). Taken together, we may con-
clude that in democratic socialist states—unlike
in authoritarian socialist states—the legacy of
socialism, even if articulated in a more contem-
porary terminology and by political actors other
than the official Left, continues to inspire more
egalitarian alternatives to the overall drive to-
ward accumulation by dispossession.
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